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when it is caused or strengthened by activity in a collective action 
setting, and when the reciprocal hopeful expressions of individual 
group members result in an emotional atmosphere of hope that 
extends across the group. In the context of social movements, 
collective hope emerges alongside the collective intentions and 
actions of the solidarity group: namely, in the pursuit of a form of 
social justice that inspires the movement. I then suggest that the 
object of collective hope borne of solidarity is the guiding ideal of 
justice and reflect on what it might mean to hope well for justice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In these moments of rupture, people find themselves 
members of a “we” that did not until then exist, at 
least not as an entity with agency and identity and 
potency; new possibilities suddenly emerge, or that 
old dream of a just society reemerges—and—at least 
for a little while—shines. 
– Rebecca Solnit 
 
My aim in this paper is to understand what it means to hope together, 
to capture the feeling of being swept up by a hope that is larger than 
oneself. Hope was, for example, quite central to the Civil Rights 
Movement, contributing in powerful ways to the collective struggle 
for racial justice. More recently, the Me Too Movement has inspired 
many women and feminist allies, renewing feminists’ hope that 
women’s humanity and rights might someday be affirmed. But what 
is the nature of hope in these contexts, and can they be captured by 
the hopes we have as individuals? When Oprah Winfrey called for 
hope at the Golden Globes, declaring that a “new day is on the 
horizon!” what was the hope that many felt in that moment? 
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I propose an account of collective hope to make sense of at 
least one form of hope that arises in collective struggles against 
oppression. I begin by reviewing some recent literature on the nature 
of hope. I then explore the relationship between hope and solidarity 
to demonstrate the ways in which solidarity can give rise to hope. I 
suggest that the hope borne of solidarity is collective when it is 
shared by at least some others, when it is caused or strengthened by 
activity in a collective action setting, and when the reciprocal 
hopeful expressions of individual group members result in an 
emotional atmosphere of hope that extends across the group. In the 
context of social movements, I argue that collective hope emerges 
alongside the collective intentions and actions of the solidarity 
group: namely, in the pursuit of a form of social justice that inspires 
the movement. I then suggest that the object of collective hope borne 
of solidarity is the guiding ideal of justice and reflect on what it 
might mean to hope well for justice.1 
 
2. What is Hope? 
 
There is growing literature in philosophy on the nature and 
value of hope. Philosophers typically agree that hope is a 
paradigmatically future-oriented attitude involving at least the 
desire for an outcome and a belief that the outcome is possible 
(Downie 1963; Day 1969). This is what has become known as the 
standard or orthodox definition of hope (Meirav 2009; Martin 2014). 
But many scholars have argued that the standard account of hope as 
a combination of belief and desire does not quite capture the nature 
of our significant hopes (Bovens 1999; Pettit 2004; Meirav 2009; 
Martin 2014; Calhoun 2018).2 A number of competing theories have 
emerged in recent decades to explain what hoping for an outcome 
involves beyond desire and belief. For example, Luc Bovens (1999) 
suggests that hope consists of “mental imaging,” or conscious 
thoughts about what it would be like for the hoped-for outcome to 
obtain. Adrienne M. Martin (2014) defends an account of hope as a 
way of seeing the possibility that a desired outcome might come 
 
1 Some readers might reject the possibility of there being social groups and 
collectives at all. My aim is not to do the metaphysics behind group ontology, but 
to engage with those who believe that groups exist and to show how some of those 
groups might hope. Thanks to Barrett Emerick for urging me to be more explicit 
about this goal. 
2 One of the central problems is that it is possible for two people to have equivalent 
desires and to assign the exact same probability estimates to the desired outcome, 
while one person hopes and the other despairs (Meirav 2009). In other words, 
despair — that is, the opposite of hope — also involves the belief in the possibility 
(but not certainty) that a desired outcome will obtain. Obviously, something is 
missing from the belief-desire account. Emerging theories of hope attempt to 
resolve what that missing element is. 
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about as licensing hopeful activities such as fantasizing about, 
planning for, and anticipating the hoped-for outcome. And Cheshire 
Calhoun (2018) defends the view that hope is a phenomenological 
idea of the future as one in which the desire constitutive of hope has 
been fulfilled. Although there are clear differences between these 
and other accounts of the nature of hope in the literature, Adrienne 
M. Martin (2019) suggests that a consensus view has emerged 
according to which hope is an attitude that consists of the desire for 
an outcome, the belief that it is possible, and a positively toned 
“what if” attitude toward the hoped-for end. 
But one might ask for a fuller characterization of what this 
positively toned “what if” attitude characteristic of hope. My own 
view is that the third element of hope is a way of seeing or 
perceiving in a favorable light the possibility that the desired 
outcome obtains. Hope is thus similar to other emotions which are 
perceptual-like experiences of their objects. Christine Tappolet 
(2016) identifies key similarities between emotions and sense-
perceptions that can be extended to capture the crucial “what if” 
attitude in hope. For example, both emotions and sense-perceptions 
are conscious states with a phenomenological character or “what it 
is like” experience. There is something that it is like to have the 
visual perception of an object as blue, just like there is something 
that it is like to have the experience of fear and to see something as 
dangerous (Tappolet 2016, 19). However, our “what it is like” 
experiences are not directly chosen or a result of inferences (as in 
active mental states like belief and judgment). Instead, we are struck 
by them as largely passive responses to our environments. When I 
walk outside, I see (through my visual perception) mountains in the 
distance; and when I witness a bike being stolen, I see (through my 
emotional experience of anger) the act as wrong. Such experiences 
are analogical: their content is sensitive to variations in what is 
perceived. When we see red objects, our visual perceptions are 
sensitive to fine-grained variations in redness (e.g., faint red vs. 
bright red). Similarly, our emotions come in variations of intensity. 
I might be mildly angry when a close friend forgets my birthday 
(seeing the act as only slightly offensive), but strongly angry when 
a friend says something blatantly sexist (seeing the act as strongly 
offensive). 
When we hope – that is, when we see in a favorable light the 
possibility that a desired outcome one believes to be possible obtains 
– this seeing-as emotional experience can be understood as 
analogous to sense-perception. Hope, like sense-perceptions, is a 
conscious mental state with a phenomenological character: there is 
something that it is like to hope for an outcome. It is also a largely 
passive response to situations over which we do not have direct or 
immediate control (see e.g., Solomon 1976). We find ourselves with 
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hopes that we did not directly choose to have, though we can (as in 
the case of other emotions) attempt to acquire or abandon hopes 
through focus, positive thinking exercises, confronting evidence, 
and so on.3 Hope has what Elijah Chudnoff (2012) refers to as 
presentational phenomenology: in hoping, the situation appears a 
certain way to the agent (Milona and Stockdale 2018). In particular, 
it appears as though the hoped-for outcome might really come about. 
And like other emotions, hope comes in degrees of intensity: we can 
be mildly, moderately, or strongly hopeful. I might, for example, be 
only mildly hopeful about getting a job because of how competitive 
I know the job market to be, but strongly hopeful about receiving an 
offer after an interview that went very well. 
Hope, then, seems to be analogous to sense-perception in a 
manner parallel to other emotions. Hope involves seeing in a 
favorable light the possibility that a desired outcome obtains – a kind 
of non-doxastic representation of the agent’s situation. But as we 
have begun to see, hope is also affective in character. As Peter 
Goldie explains, “when an emotion is directed toward its object, 
then this is a sort of feeling toward the object” (Goldie 2004, 96). 
The relevant feeling is not a physiological feeling (although it may 
accompany physiological changes), like the feeling of one’s heart 
pounding or the feeling of sweaty palms. Rather, it is an emotional 
feeling: a feeling that is directed toward an object in the world 
“beyond the bounds of the body,” a feeling that is bound up with 
how we take in the world of experience (Goldie 2009, 238). And 
seeing in a favorable light the possibility that a significant desired 
outcome obtains certainly feels a certain way to the person hoping. 
As Margaret Urban Walker argues, when we hope, “there is a sense, 
and it can be an actual feeling, of ‘pulling for’ the yet undetermined 
resolution one desires” (Walker 2006, 45). Martin (2014) describes 
this feeling as anticipating the hoped-for end’s obtaining. 
 
3 By “passive,” I just mean to emphasize the ways in which hope sweeps over us 
similarly to fear, despair, pride, and so on. And though we can’t choose our 
emotions in the same way that we can choose our actions, we can exercise some 
control over hope by engaging in activities aimed at cultivating, increasing, or 
paring down our hopes. 
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My aim is to make sense of how the emotion of hope 
emerges through solidarity in agents’ pursuit of a more just world.4 
 
3. Solidarity and Emerging Hope 
 
Feminists have long defended the role of solidarity in 
struggles against sexist oppression (e.g., hooks 1986; Mohanty 
2003; Scholz 2009). There is also an emerging interest in the 
concept of solidarity in moral, social, and political philosophy, and 
in bioethics. In an increasingly complex and global world, 
philosophers have begun to recognize that the concepts and 
commitments most familiar to us — such as individual rights and 
autonomy — are incapable of generating adequate moral guidelines 
for how we should live (Sherwin 2012). In shifting focus away from 
the individual towards the collective, the concept of solidarity 
challenges us to think not just about how I should live and act, but 
how we should live and act together. Thus solidarity, some 
philosophers have argued, holds promise for helping us to 
understand our moral obligations in addressing threats that target 
whole social groups — in the case of global threats such as climate 
change, the whole planet — and to build a better world (Jennings 
and Dawson 2015; Doan and Sherwin 2016; Kolers 2016; Sherwin 
and Stockdale 2017). 
 Scholars have distinguished between many different kinds 
of solidarity including feminist solidarity, Black solidarity, and 
other forms of race-based solidarity (hooks 1986; Mohanty 2003; 
Shelby 2005; Blum 2007; Scholz 2009). I want to focus on what I 
think of as moral-political solidarity, namely, solidarity based in a 
shared moral vision carried out through political action. Within 
moral-political solidarity, there will certainly be what Sally Scholz 
(2008) refers to as social solidarity: solidarity based on common 
experiences and identities, such as women’s common experience of 
sexism in a patriarchal society. This form of solidarity brings people 
together based on their membership in the same social group, and a 
shared sense of identity that includes “cultural forms, practices, or 
 
4 There is a further question of whether hope might also be a virtue. It is famously 
one of the three Christian virtues; and there is emerging interest in the question of 
how hope might be an intellectual, moral, democratic, and political virtue (e.g., 
Moellendorf 2006; Snow 2015; Snow 2018; Milona 2020). Some philosophers 
have argued that there might even be a form of “existential” hope (Ratcliffe 2013) 
or “basal” hope (Calhoun 2018) – that is, a feeling of hope without an object. 
Others insist that hope is always about something, even if the hope in question 
takes the whole world as its object (Milona and Stockdale 2018). So there remains 
ongoing debate not just about the nature of hope and how to characterize various 
kinds of hope, but also hope’s value to our moral, social, and political lives. I set 
some of these questions aside to focus on developing an account of one form of 
collective hope. 
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ways of life” (Young 1991, 43). There is, for example, social 
solidarity amongst women, Black people, and Indigenous people 
who find themselves in solidarity with others based on their shared 
social location. But it is not only members of oppressed social 
groups who share a moral vision for the elimination of their 
oppression, and who undertake political actions to eliminate it. 
People from many different backgrounds voluntarily join in 
solidarity with others against sexism, racism, colonialism, and other 
forms of oppression. I want to understand the relationship between 
hope and this form of moral-political solidarity as it brings people 
together across difference, united not always by shared experiences 
or identities but by their sense of what has to be done together in the 
pursuit of justice. 
 Sally Scholz (2008) explores the role of hope in solidarity in 
her Political Solidarity, arguing that “hope is the only necessary 
feeling for political solidarity” (81). She says: 
 
Political solidarity is primarily a movement of social 
change…. Hope means that they believe the future can be 
better than the present. The moral sentiment of hope 
motivates activity within solidarity because it fosters the 
desire for the final ends or goals … of political solidarity. 
(Scholz 2008, 81-2) 
 
It is not exactly clear how hope might be necessary for solidarity. 
One interpretation is that hope is necessary for moral motivation to 
join in solidarity. As Scholz suggests, “without it [hope] there would 
be no reason to act collectively” (82). It is certainly right that hope 
can motivate people to come together in solidarity against injustice. 
But it is also the case that the beginnings of a solidarity movement 
are evidence not of hope for some participants, but rather its loss or 
absence. For example, the emergence of solidarity and 
corresponding resistance efforts can reveal a loss or absence of hope 
that traditional means of realizing moral and political goals – such 
as government and law enforcement – will pull through. As 
journalist and activist Sarah Jaffe (2018) writes in the context of the 
Me Too Movement:  
 
Perhaps one of the deepest assumptions of the Me Too 
movement is that the society we live in provides us no real 
options for justice. The court system does not work for 
survivors and HR is a tool of the boss. The tools we need do 
not exist yet, so we must build from the ground up. 
 
So hope in the court system, for example, is lost. Yet it seems that 
social movements like Me Too can themselves create or restore hope 
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for those of us who might otherwise find ourselves in despair. Hope 
can, in other words, be produced by solidarity. 
The hope borne of solidarity begins with the recognition that 
there exist other people who are committed to standing by oneself 
against injustice. We can learn about this form of hope from 
testimony of those who join in solidarity movements. For example, 
Rita Wong, Canadian writer and environmental activist, recounts 
finding hope through participating in the Healing Walk in Alberta’s 
Tar Sands. She says: 
 
On my own, I think I would have shrunk down into despair 
or numbed myself because I felt incapable of addressing the 
huge, overwhelming scale of the destruction. Yet, on this 
walk, the sick feeling co-exists with a quietly hopeful one, 
invoked by the efforts of my co-walkers, as well as the many 
people we know who cannot make the journey to Fort 
McMurray, the epicentre of tar sands extraction in Northern 
Alberta, but who ask us to carry their wishes and prayers for 
the healing of the land with us. (Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 2013, 103) 
 
Wong’s testimony of the “overwhelming scale of destruction” 
captures the threat to hope that Indigenous and environmental 
activists face as they challenge powerful institutions to fight for 
Indigenous lands and waters, and for the health of the whole planet. 
But Wong’s testimony also embodies a renewed hope that arose 
through solidarity. Wong found hope in the recognition that her co-
walkers share her moral vision for a healthy planet on which 
Indigenous lands and waters are protected from environmental 
damage, and that, they too, are ready to stand with her in opposition 
to the people and institutions standing in the way of this shared 
vision. Similarly, Patrisse Cullors, one of the founders of Black 
Lives Matter, explained that Black Lives Matter seeks to “provide 
hope and inspiration for collective action to build collective power 
to achieve collective transformation, rooted in grief and rage but 
pointed towards vision and dreams” (Solnit 2016, xiv). 
These examples suggest that there is a way to collectively 
recover hope, for those of us who might be struggling to find hope 
on our own. As Victoria McGeer (2004) suggests, “recovering hope 
depends on discovering some new way of relating to others, 
specifically a way that recognizes the interdependence of the self 
and other in generating the best confidence for keeping hope alive” 
(122). Perhaps the hope that is generated through solidarity 
manifests, at times, as an existential or basal emotion – a felt sense 
of hope without an object (Ratcliffe 2013; Calhoun 2018). But I 
think that the hope borne of solidarity is often a renewed or 
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strengthened hope for some form of justice. It is a kind of collective 
hope for justice. 
 
4. Collective Hope 
 
What exactly does it mean for a hope to be collective? I 
begin with the intuition that there seems to be something 
fundamentally different between hoping for one’s own happiness 
alongside others who share the hope for happiness and hoping for 
gender justice as part of the Me Too Movement alongside others 
who share the hope for gender justice. In the happiness case, it 
would seem odd to construe the hope as a collective hope even 
though most of us, as human beings, hope for happiness. Each of us 
who hopes for happiness constitute an aggregate in virtue of this 
attribute – namely, that we each hope for happiness (see Young 
1991, 43). In other words, we share the hope for happiness in the 
minimal sense of hoping for the same outcome.5 But the hope of the 
Me Too Movement is different. It seems to belong not to each 
individual who hopes for gender justice, but to a collective: women 
and feminist allies who share in the hope of the movement. 
There are at least two routes to take in order to make sense 
of the hope of the Me Too movement. The first is to argue that the 
hope is an aggregate of and reducible to the hopes of individuals, 
and the second is to argue that there is a kind of hope – collective 
hope – that is appropriately ascribed to the movement, or to the 
solidarity group.6 I want to take the second route and propose an 
account of collective hope. I argue that collective hope often 
emerges alongside a collective intention of the solidarity group: 
namely, an intention to pursue the form of justice that inspires the 
movement. As we will see, the reductivist about collective hope 
faces the challenge of capturing the phenomenology of collective 
hope – a felt experience of hope which is quite different from the 
phenomenology of standard individual hopes.  
I have suggested that hope involves seeing or perceiving in 
a favorable light the possibility that a desired outcome obtains. 
Building from this understanding of hope, hope becomes collective 
when: 
 
 
5 This is not to say that shared hopes are not often powerful. The shared hope to 
find a vaccine for the novel coronavirus of 2019, for example, is a hope that 
almost all people in our world share at the time of writing. It can motivate 
actions in the pursuit of a vaccine (for those of us who can affect the outcome), 
and it can help to sustain at least some of us through a profoundly difficult time.  
6 I use “solidarity group”, “movement”, and “collective” interchangeably to 
include members of the relevant oppressed group and their allies. I acknowledge 
that there is much more to say about who is a member of these collectives, and 
who counts as an “ally.” 
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(1) The hope is shared by at least some others; 
(2) The favorable perception of the possibility that the 
desired outcome might obtain, and corresponding hopeful 
feelings, is caused (or is strengthened) by activity in a 
collective action setting; and 
(3) The reciprocal hopeful expressions of individual group 
members result in an emotional atmosphere of hope that 
extends across the collective. 
 
The first condition is relatively straightforward: in order to have 
collective hope, or any genuinely collective emotion, the emotion 
must be experienced by more than one person. (I say more about 
what it means to “share” a hope below.) The second condition 
captures the causal and dependency relations between the group and 
the hope: the hope is caused or strengthened by a collective action 
setting and depends upon collective activity for its existence. For 
example, a woman might have very little hope about women’s 
rights; and she might participate in a protest out of anger and a strong 
sense of justice despite seeing no instrumental reasons for doing so. 
But joining a group of women and allies coming together at a march, 
perhaps to take action on sexual violence against women and to 
promote women’s reproductive rights, might cause the woman to 
feel a sense of hope for women’s rights, seeing the possibility of 
gender justice in a more favorable light in that moment than she 
otherwise would. 
 The second and third conditions capture the difference 
between hoping for one’s own happiness alongside others who also 
hope for happiness and hoping for gender justice as part of a 
solidarity movement. In the former case, I see in a favorable light 
the possibility of achieving my own happiness. Although other 
people (e.g., my loved ones) might also see the possibility of my 
attaining happiness favorably, there is no group formed around the 
goal of achieving my happiness. When I hope for gender justice 
alongside others in a collective action setting, in contrast, the hope 
belongs to the group whose goal is to achieve justice for women and 
whose members intend to pursue the outcome as a group. The hope 
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is part of a collective rather than multiple individuals who happen to 
share the same hope.7 
 But understanding how, exactly, hope emerges at the level 
of a collective requires a deeper understanding of the collective 
itself. Philosophers interested in collective activity have explored 
the ways in which collectives might have beliefs, intentions, and 
actions, and more recently emotions of their own. I suggest that 
collective hope borne of solidarity emerges from the joint 
commitments and actions of the solidarity group. Borrowing from 
Margaret Gilbert: “A population P has a collective intention to do A 
if and only if members of P are jointly committed to intending as a 
body to do A” (Gilbert 2002, 125). For example, I might be 
personally committed to gender justice. But if I express a readiness 
(verbally or through other behavior) to commit alongside others to 
gender justice, I contribute to the formation of a joint commitment 
to pursue gender justice. Joint commitments cannot be broken down 
into each individual’s personal commitment, since they arise from 
individuals together determining what they intend, as a group, to do. 
Consequently, I might be jointly committed to intending to do A as 
part of a body without a personal commitment to intending to do A. 
I might, for example, be jointly committed to pursuing gender 
justice as part of the Me Too Movement even if I have no personal 
commitment to pursuing gender justice on my own. (Perhaps I judge 
that such a pursuit would be futile.) 
 Social movements have their own goals and intentions, 
which direct the activities of the collective.8 And it is not difficult to 
find out about the goals, intentions, and actions of social movements 
currently at work; this information is readily available on official 
websites and social media pages through “missions” and “vision 
statements.” On the Me Too website, we find that the Me Too vision 
is, broadly, justice for women with respect to holding perpetrators 
of sexual violence accountable for their actions. Within this broad 
goal, the focus is primarily on helping survivors (especially young 
 
7 This is certainly not the only potential form of collective hope, and there are 
even cases in which a group is formed around the goal of achieving another 
person’s happiness, or their wellbeing. For example, patients in psychiatric 
facilities often have a team of healthcare providers assigned to their case: 
physicians, psychologists, social workers, nurses, and so on. Since the team of 
healthcare providers make up a collective formed around a common goal – 
namely, to improve the patient’s wellbeing – they might share in a collective 
hope to improve the patient’s wellbeing. In this paper, I remain focused on cases 
of collective hope that arise through solidarity. But there are other potential 
cases of collective hope that are interesting and important too. 
8 As bell hooks explains, “To experience solidarity, we must have a community 
of interests, shared beliefs and goals around which to unite, to build 
Sisterhood… Solidarity requires sustained, ongoing commitment” (hooks 1986, 
138). 
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women of color from low income communities). As the movement 
has grown, this vision has broadened: “what started as a grassroots 
work has expanded to reach a global community of survivors from 
all walks of life” (Me Too 2018). The vision states: 
 
Our goal is also to reframe and expand the global 
conversation around sexual violence to speak to the needs of 
a broader spectrum of survivors. Young people, queer, trans, 
and disabled folks, Black women and girls, and all 
communities of color. We want perpetrators to be held 
accountable, and we want strategies implemented to sustain 
long term, systemic change…. We want to uplift radical 
community healing as a social justice issue and are 
committed to disrupting all systems that allow sexual 
violence to flourish. (Me Too 2018) 
 
These goals and priorities (“our goal,” “we want”) belong to the 
group itself, not just any one individual desiring, intending, or acting 
alone. Although Tarana Burke as an individual founded the Me Too 
movement in 2006, and thus her personal intention to pursue social 
justice with respect to sexual violence against women has certainly 
helped to shape the movement, Me Too is essentially a collective 
endeavor. It is a product of individuals coming together and 
negotiating the movement’s goals, intentions, and priorities, and 
how the group will pursue its ends. 
 But the joint commitment to intend to pursue gender justice 
as part of the Me Too Movement will not necessarily secure the 
outcome; it is quite possible that the collective intentions and actions 
of the group will fail. Thus, individuals who are jointly committed 
to pursuing gender justice as part of the collective might form the 
hope that their efforts will be successful. Of course, they might hope 
in the standard individual sense (as when a bystander hopes that the 
Me Too movement succeeds in its aims) or as a member of the group 
(as when I form the group-based hope as a woman that the Me Too 
Movement succeeds in its aims). But they might also hope in the 
collective sense: desiring gender justice; believing that success in 
securing the outcome is possible but not certain; and seeing in a 
favorable light (or more favorable light) the possibility of achieving 
gender justice, with new or strengthened hopeful feelings, through 
participating in the collective actions of the solidarity group. 
Importantly, one might not have an individual or group-based hope 
yet share in the collective hope. A male ally might not be hopeful 
about achieving gender justice on his own; and I might not be 
hopeful (as a woman) that sexist oppression will ever be eliminated. 
But when the ally and I jointly commit alongside others to pursue 
gender justice as part of the movement, and when we show up in a 
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collective action setting, we might find ourselves sharing in a 
collective hope for gender justice.9 
 But what, exactly, does it mean to share in a collective hope? 
I suggest that sharing or participating in a collective hope is 
phenomenologically different from both individual hopes and 
shared hopes in the minimal sense of hoping for the same thing as 
others (e.g., as in the hope for happiness).10 In the individual and 
minimally shared cases of hope, hope is an affective state that feels 
like something for the individual who hopes. But the affective 
character of collective hope episodes – how, exactly, collective hope 
is experienced – is different. Seeing in a favorable light the 
possibility that our (those of us here, in this moment) desired end 
might be attained feels differently from seeing in a favorable light 
the possibility that my desired end might be attained. New research 
in the philosophy of mind supports this hypothesis. For example, 
Joel Krueger (2014) discusses the possibility of what he calls 
environmentally extended emotions: emotions that are extended 
beyond an agent’s body in such a way that the emotion itself is 
constituted by factors external to the agent. Krueger uses the 
example of environmentally extended emotions through music. 
Emotions become environmentally extended through music in the 
sense that the listener “integrates with musical dynamics in a 
reciprocal, mutually-modulatory way”; or, in other words, that what 
the listener hears determines how he responds by way of the 
emotions, and those responses shape what the listener hears, which 
then informs further responses (Krueger 2014, 544).  Krueger argues 
that emotions might become collectively environmentally extended 
when they are shared by two or more individuals. As he puts it: “the 
emotion is something that emerges over time as a group-level trait; 
it extends across the various individuals making up the group” 
(Krueger 2014, 536). For example, at a funeral, the subdued nature 
of funeral music combined with the presence of other people 
grieving results in a collective experience of grief which shapes the 
character of grief for individuals. The dynamic results in an 
 
9 Gilbert (2014) discusses another way in which her theory of collective 
intention might make sense of collective emotions. She argues that collective 
emotions are emotions to which group members are jointly committed. I think 
this view requires too strong of an endorsement of one’s emotion. I might not be 
committed to hope, though in jointly committing to an end and participating 
alongside others in a collective action setting, I might find myself swept up in a 
collective hope that we will succeed. Collective hope, on my view, is an 
affective state that is appropriately ascribed to groups. It is not a joint 
commitment to experiencing the emotion itself. 
10 I imagine that two individuals sharing a hope might also have a distinct 
phenomenological character than that of individual hopes; for example, pair 
figure skaters’ hope that they (together) will win nationals might have a distinct 
phenomenological feel from a solo skater’s hope that they win nationals. I set 
these interesting cases aside to focus on hopes borne of solidarity. 
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emotional convergence between them: when others react (for 
example, when they cry), one feels one’s own responses align with 
the emotional responses of others nearby (Krueger 2014). 
 I want to suggest that emotional convergence between 
individuals is what results in a sharing of hope that goes beyond 
hoping for the same outcome. As Dario Páez and Bernard Rimé 
(2014) explain, individuals’ gestures, movements, speech, and so on 
result in “an atmosphere of emotion and fervor” which transforms 
individual emotional feelings into shared emotional feelings (207). 
These shared emotional feelings, along with the experience of being 
in community with other people, combine in such a way that 
“participants evolve to a sense of group membership” and 
“experience the ‘we’ in place of the ‘I’” (207). For example, in 
listening to a feminist activist’s speech in a room full of supporters, 
the speech (including the content of words spoken, tone, and volume 
of voice) as well as the presence of others passionately listening 
(their facial expressions, verbal responses, and body language) 
shapes how individuals perceive and feel, including by way of their 
emotions. They come to see in a favorable light the possibility of the 
desired outcome’s obtaining, often more intensely than they 
otherwise would, with new or strengthened feelings of hopefulness. 
Their hopeful expressions (e.g., smiling, nodding, cheering) then 
feed back into the group, enhancing the hopeful feelings of others. 
The result is emotional convergence, a shared feeling of hope, which 
transforms the sense that “I am hoping” into the sense that “we are 
hoping together.” Individuals become aware of a hope that stretches 
beyond all of them, a hope in which each person can share, but 
which belongs to the “we” that has formed in this moment. 
This is not to say that how collective hope feels is equivalent 
amongst members of the collective. The collective “we” notably 
includes people who occupy different social locations which affect 
how they emotionally experience the world, and consequently how 
they hope (Stockdale 2019).  For example, Black women, 
Indigenous women, other women of color, and white women may 
collectively hope for gender justice yet how they experience 
collective hope in response to an Indigenous woman’s powerful call 
to action at a rally will likely vary. Hope is relational, even at the 
collective level. This is consistent with the existence of a collective 
hope for gender justice in which all participants who are jointly 
committed to gender justice can participate. Just like each person’s 
actions as part of a collective action depend upon who they are in 
relation to others and to the cause, so too each participant’s 
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emotional experience as part of a collective hope depends upon who 
they are in relation to others and to the cause.11 
I have argued that the collective hope borne of solidarity thus 
emerges from shared experiences of hope between members of a 
collective who are acting together in the pursuit of justice. These 
reflections suggest that there are good reasons to think that a form 
of collective hope emerges in social movements when individuals 
come together in solidarity. I have argued that collective hope 
emerges alongside the collective intentions and actions of a 
solidarity group, and that collective hope is phenomenologically 
different from individual hope. I suspect that what is “collective” 
about collective hope, or what is not easily reducible to the hopes of 
individuals, is the phenomenological character of the emotion. 
Although it is felt and experienced by individuals, the hope extends 
beyond them in and through the collective, resulting in an emotional 
atmosphere of hope that is appropriately ascribed to the collective 
itself.12 Research in philosophy and the social sciences on 
“emotional convergence” and “emotional atmosphere” helps to 
illustrate how collective hope emerges, paving the way for new and 
insightful ways of understanding collective emotional phenomena 
in solidarity movements. But there remains much room for debate 
about how to best characterize collective hope and how collective 
hope might manifest differently in different contexts. My aim has 
been quite modest: to provide a starting point for theorizing one 
form of collective hope in the pursuit of justice. 
 But what is the object of collective hope? Solnit suggests that 
the “old dream of a just society” emerges in these moments of 
rupture, moments in which individuals find themselves as part of a 
“we” through which new possibilities emerge. The emergence of 
collective hope borne of solidarity thus raises the question of how 
we might hope well for justice. For some of us, our hopes for justice 
are modest, as we hope for small victories that will improve the 
world for the better, however slightly, and however long those 
improvements last. For others, their hopes for justice are ambitious; 
 
11 This feature of the account of collective hope I am offering weakens the sense 
in which hope can be collective, since collective hope does not require each 
individual to feel the exact same thing. But I suspect that those who insist on a 
theory of collective hope (and other emotions) that explains how each person 
feels the exact same thing will end up with skepticism about the possibility of 
collective hope and other emotions altogether. It’s my view that a theory of 
collective hope should accommodate rather than explain away variation in 
emotional experiences based on personal and social difference. 
12 As Bennett Helm (2014) suggests, “the idea is not that the group itself has a 
mind and mental states in exactly the same way as individuals do; rather, it is 
that there is a phenomenon at the level of the group that can properly be 
understood to be an emotional phenomenon and that is irreducible to the states 
of mind of the individual group members” (47). 
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and some people even sustain hope for justice itself. I want to 
suggest that these two ways of hoping for justice, what I call modest 
hope and utopian hope, are ways in which we can individually and 
collectively hope well for justice. 
 
5. Hoping Well for Justice 
 
When we hope for racial justice, the elimination of sexist 
oppression, and a world in which all people have the income and 
resources they need to live a good life, we are hoping for outcomes 
that would contribute to the collective project of achieving that 
dream of a just society: a state in which there would be no more 
moral work left to do but to maintain the end we have reached. The 
utopian hope for complete justice is thus a hope whose realization 
would radically transform the world such that a moral ideal of 
complete justice (hereafter, justice), the object of hope, is obtained. 
Although I wish to remain neutral about what theory of justice is 
correct, if any, I understand the utopian hope for justice as a hope to 
achieve the moral ideal of justice.13 
 As Luc Bovens (1999) aptly puts it in his discussion of the 
value of individuals’ hopes, it is “notoriously difficult to make sense 
of utopian hopes” (674, footnote 4). The difficulty is that, for some 
people, the utopian hope for justice functions as a guiding ideal that 
directs their more modest hopes, but it is itself not really a hope. In 
other words, some agents appeal to the moral ideal of “justice” to 
form hopes the realization of which would constitute progress 
toward the ideal, even if they do not hope that we will ever reach the 
ideal in reality. For example, one might hope to prevent a pipeline 
from being built that will be detrimental to Indigenous lands, waters, 
and health; and the hope to prevent the pipeline from being built is 
part of the hope for environmental justice. The hope for 
environmental justice is, then, part of the hope for justice. But not 
everyone who has the first hope has the second; and not everyone 
who has the first and second hopes has the third. It is possible to 
hope to prevent a pipeline from being built while having no hope 
 
13 We might reasonably rule out some utopian hopes, such as the hope that 
“America will be made great again” where “greatness” seems to refer to a 
history of colonialism, racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, and other 
forms of oppression envisioned in some sort of utopian American future. We 
might also rule out utopian hopes that are unrealistic, such as the utopian hope to 
live in a world of only altruists (see Howard 2018, 7). Although there is much 
more to say about the nature of and justification for particular utopian hopes, I 
limit my focus to utopian hopes for justice where agents’ the conception of 
justice envisioned does not clearly miss the mark, both about what is just and 
what is possible. I don’t suppose most agents who hope for justice have a well-
worked out theory of justice either, though they might still testify to having the 
hope for justice, nonetheless. And their expressions of hope are genuine. 
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that environmental justice, and (by implication) justice, will ever be 
attained. 
We can see these different hopes for justice at work in 
collective action settings, too. Some people might show up at a rally 
for environmental justice inspired by a recent approval for a pipeline 
to be built, participating in the collective intention to prevent the 
pipeline to protect Indigenous lands, waters, and health. We can 
imagine some participants attending the rally out of a sense of duty, 
even if they have no hope that collective efforts to prevent the 
pipeline from being built will be successful.14 Others might 
participate out of the modest hope that environmental activists might 
prevent this one pipeline from being built, without hope that 
environmental justice will ever be attained. But even these 
participants who are unhopeful about the possibility of 
environmental justice itself, as individuals, might find themselves 
sharing in a collective hope for environmental justice. As they listen 
to powerful and inspiring speeches from Indigenous Water 
Protectors, read signs that say, “We Demand Environmental 
Justice!”, and witness the hopeful verbal and behavioral expressions 
of others, they might find themselves swept up in the collective hope 
for environmental justice, perhaps even seeing in a favorable light 
the possibility of justice itself. 
But what lessons can we learn from these collective 
experiences of hope? When the collective diffuses and we retreat to 
our homes and everyday lives, which of the above hopes should we 
attempt to sustain and pursue? Feminist scholar and activist Rebecca 
Solnit (2016) defends hoping only for small victories, not justice as 
a moral ideal. As she says: “This is Earth. It will never be heaven. 
There will always be cruelty, always be violence, always be 
destruction…. We cannot eliminate all devastation for all time, but 
we can reduce it, outlaw it, undermine its sources and foundations: 
these are victories. A better world, yes; a perfect world, never” 
(Solnit 2016, 78). So although the dream of a just society emerges 
at various moments in the form of collective hope, we can only 
reasonably sustain hope to achieve small victories, without judging 
that the realization of these hopes for small victories would 
constitute a step closer to realizing some moral ideal of justice in our 
not-yet-foreseeable collective future. 
 Similarly, Kathryn Norlock (2019) suggests that evil and 
suffering will never be eliminated and argues that “there is no reason 
to believe that the future will be one in which evils cease to be” (11). 
Although human beings are capable of changing for the better, their 
ability to do so is outmatched by the seriousness of the problems 
 
14 See Tessman (2009), Stockdale (2017), and Norlock (2019) for discussion of 
agents who persist in their moral and political struggles without hope that their 
efforts will be successful. 
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facing humanity. We are also essentially imperfect, according to 
Norlock. So the utopian hope for justice, which require us to believe 
that achieving a moral ideal is possible, is not justified. It entails a 
mistaken understanding of what it means to be human. But this 
unhopeful stance toward the possibility of attaining justice itself is 
nevertheless compatible with forming and pursuing more modest 
hopes, hopes that are even guided by the moral ideal Norlock 
believes is impossible to attain. We can, she points out, engage in 
efforts aimed at constructing just institutions even if “our efforts 
may be inadequate, or undone, or not sustained after we die” (15). 
And Norlock rejects the charge that she is advocating for a 
Sisyphean existence, for moral agents to continue rolling a ball up a 
hill only to have it topple back down, over and over, for eternity. On 
Norlock’s view, there is no hill; and “directional metaphors” are 
bound up with our wishful thinking that moral progress has an 
endpoint that we can reach if we just continue on in our moral and 
political struggles (16). We ought to, instead, just do our best, 
reveling in other goods of life including activism, recreation, and 
loving relationships as we navigate the necessarily imperfect world 
we share. 
 I share these feminist scholars’ unhopeful stance toward the 
possibility of achieving complete justice some day in the future. I 
suspect many others will share this perspective, unable to see in a 
favorable light the possibility of obtaining justice in the future, even 
slightly, and unable to feel hopeful anticipation in thinking about a 
future state of the world that is just. Like Solnit and Norlock, such 
people might not feel pulled by the need to hope for justice itself; 
they might, instead, be motivated to pursue justice by pursuing the 
mitigation of injustice. And I think that this is one way of hoping 
well for justice. But I want to make room for utopian hopers: those 
who really do believe in moral progress and who continue to hope 
that we might someday succeed in living in a just world. Utopian 
hopers, too, can hope for justice well. 
 Utopian hopers desire justice, believe that justice is possible, 
see in a favorable light the possibility of attaining justice (perhaps 
pointing to moral improvements and advancements toward the 
ideal), and feel hopeful about the possibility of achieving justice in 
the future. The cynics among us might be inclined to reject the idea 
that the utopian hope for justice can be a reasonable hope to have: 
they might judge that the moral ideal is nowhere within reach and 
hoping for justice itself can be a distraction from the concrete, real-
world actions we need to take to mitigate injustice in the here and 
now. But importantly, it might be morally valuable for people to 
form hopes related to their moral projects, even when those projects 
are wildly ambitious, perhaps even doomed to fail. An agent’s 
strong hope that sexist oppression will be eliminated in one’s 
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lifetime might be a morally praiseworthy attitude because of what it 
reveals about the agent’s moral character, even if it is unfitting to 
hope for this outcome given the evidence available. The agent might 
hope well by preserving the hope that sexist oppression will end, 
just not in our lifetime. This revised hope is an example of what 
Michael Milona (2019) calls patient hope: a hope for an outcome in 
the very distant future, one which orients attention and action toward 
what one can do to make incremental progress toward the hoped-for 
end. 
 The revised hope, the hope that sexist oppression will 
someday end, might then be part of the hope for justice; and we can 
run the same argument to defend the hope for justice. Interestingly, 
too, it is difficult to criticize the hope for justice as a moral ideal. It 
is certainly fitting to see justice as desirable and the possibility that 
justice might someday be attained in a favorable light, individually 
and collectively, given the vagueness of the “someday” represented 
in the hope. It even seems fitting to be strongly hopeful about the 
possibility that all forms of oppression will eventually end and that 
justice “will someday prevail.” When we have this hope, the 
“someday” referred to is so far into the future that it is barely even 
foreseeable — a faint, abstract future that is indeterminate. The 
utopian hope for justice is vague, open, and inarticulate; and this is 
precisely what makes criticizing it so difficult. It reaches for a moral 
ideal that we have never seen obtained before; and it might, then, be 
bound up with faith.15 For example, in hoping that justice “will 
someday prevail,” one might have faith in humanity, appealing to 
one’s faith in human beings as justification for continuing to hope.16 
  More specifically, we might have faith in humanity that 
supports our belief in humanity’s “goodness” in the Rawlsian sense 
of the term. To say that human nature is good, for Rawls (1999) “is 
to say that citizens who grow up under reasonable and just 
institutions… will affirm those institutions and act to make sure their 
social world endures” (7). And reflection on the contingency of 
historical evils and in the goodness of human nature demonstrates 
that “we must not allow these great evils of the past and present to 
undermine our hope for the future” (22). Rawls thus believes that a 
future just society is a realistic possibility for which we can 
reasonably hope. And in arguing that a just society “could and may 
 
15 Martin (2014) argues that faith is hope for an unimaginable outcome whose 
nature and goodness would transcend our own ability to understand it. Through 
such faith, the agent adopts a kind of meta-confidence that nothing she 
experiences can give her reason to abandon that hope. See Stockdale 
(forthcoming) for further discussion of the relationship between faith and hope 
in struggles against oppression. 
16 See Ryan Preston-Roedder (2013) for discussion of faith in humanity and 
Valerie Tiberius (2008) for a similar defense of the virtue of optimism about 
human nature (137-56). 
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exist,” Rawls notices that justice is physically possible (that is, 
consistent with the natural order of how human beings are and how 
they might be) as well as possible for our future world — a world in 
which historical and current injustices continue to affect us (Howard 
2018, 6). Inspired by Kant, Rawls’s hope for justice rests on a kind 
of faith beyond what we see in the world right now, faith that might 
vindicate the hope for justice. 
 So we might faithfully hope well by recognizing that the 
utopian hope is not (right now) within reach, and thus attempt to 
form hopes toward the moral ideal that are more clearly in view. The 
hopeful agent might, in other words, shift the target of the utopian 
not-yet-graspable hope to more concrete, realistic outcomes the 
obtaining of which would make progress toward justice. For 
example, one might hope for gender justice as part of one’s hope for 
justice by forming the less ambitious hopes for equal pay for equal 
work, an effective plan to implement recommendations to end the 
crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous women (as in Canada at 
the time of writing), and increased government support for 
reproductive rights. Or they might find themselves sharing in a 
collective hope for gender justice itself while remaining mindful of 
the obstacles we must collectively encounter before the hope borne 
of solidarity can be realized. 
 Rawls seems to think that reasonable people are required to 
maintain the utopian hope for a just future, since doing so guards 
against feelings of futility and diminished moral motivation. But the 
claim that hope is required for moral motivation is too strong. 
People can be motivated to continue on in their moral and political 
struggles without hope that their efforts will be successful (Tessman 
2009; Stockdale 2017). And as Solnit and Norlock teach us, people 
can also hope well for justice by hoping for small victories that will 
diminish harm and improve people’s lives in the here and now — 
even if they have no hope in the attainability of justice itself. 
I see both Rawls on the one hand, and Solnit and Norlock on 
the other, as taking two different but equally permissible stances 
toward the future. As long as the agent who hopes only for small 
victories does not lose her commitment and motivation to continue 
striving to attain her moral ends, she is justified in pursuing modest 
hopes while remaining hopeless about the possibility of achieving 
complete justice. And as long as the agent who hopes that justice 
“will someday prevail” has, as Rawls does, rational beliefs about the 
magnitude and severity of evil, suffering, and injustice in the world 
right now, they are justified in their ambitious hope. What is 
important is that the object of hope, or the guiding ideal — the 
elimination of all forms of injustice in the world — structures and 
guides individual and collective action; and that we do not lose sight 
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of where we have been, how things are now, and where we need to 
go. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that, through solidarity, a new form of hope 
can emerge: a collective hope borne of solidarity. In this form of 
collective hope, individuals’ hopeful feelings converge with the 
emotional feelings of others, producing an emotional atmosphere of 
hope which transforms the experience of “I am hoping” into an 
experience of “we are hoping as a group.” The object of the 
collective hope of solidarity is, I have argued, justice as a guiding 
ideal – often a particular form of social justice attached to the 
“vision” of a social movement. Members of a solidarity group 
jointly commit to pursuing a form of justice together, and in seeing 
that success in securing their goals is possible but not certain, they 
often form the hope – individually and collectively – that they will 
succeed. The hope borne of solidarity thus raises the question of how 
we might hope well for justice. I have argued that, whether we 
ultimately sustain hope for justice itself (“utopian hope”), or 
whether we sustain hope only for small victories that might fade 
away as injustices under oppressive conditions take new shapes and 
forms (“modest hope”), both can be ways in which we can together 
hope well for justice.17 
  
 
17 Thanks to Cheshire Calhoun, Mercy Corredor, Barrett Emerick, Matt 
Hernandez, Graham Hubbs, David Hunter, Chike Jeffers, Adrienne Martin, 
Colin Macleod, Michael Milona, Maura Priest, Catherine Rioux, Greg 
Scherkoske, Susan Sherwin, Lisa Tessman, Audrey Yap, audiences at the New 
Directions in the Philosophy of Hope conference at Goethe University and the 
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Meeting in New Orleans, as well as 
anonymous referees for Feminist Philosophy Quarterly and Oxford University 
Press for helpful feedback on drafts and conversations that have significantly 
improved this paper and the broader project to which it belongs. 
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